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In most economic sectors, increases in capital (i.e., investments) are often considered virtuous, indicating
confidence in the future and expected growth. In fisheries, however, investments are often harmful, as they may
lead to increases in fleet capacity, which is not desirable considering the fully exploited or overexploited status of
most fish stocks (natural capital), and the dissipation of the resource rent (overcapitalisation). In the EU, the
number of fishing vessels have been decreasing for many years, but the fishing capacity is often claimed to have
increased. In other words, there are less vessels, but the remaining ones have a higher fishing capacity. In this
study, we analyse the evolution of the EU fishing industry’s investments for the period 2008–2016, and whether
these investments have been beneficial. Results show that despite the overall decrease in the number of vessels
and their average value, investments in some fleets have increased. Moreover, investment decisions (i.e.,
whether to invest or disinvest) have been more accurate in recent years, leading to a better economic perfor-
mance. However, results vary by the scale of the fishing activity (small-scale and large scale fleets) and sea basin
(Northeast Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea).
1. Introduction
The possibility to increase individual profits by increasing inputs
beyond the level required to achieve the maximum economic yield
(MEY), leads to the existence of overcapacity in poorly-managed fish-
eries, and consequently of overcapitalisation, depletion of the fish
stocks and dissipation of the resource rent (Clark, 1990; Pauly et al.,
2002; Berkes et al., 2006; Willman et al., 2009; Worm et al., 2009).
Managing fisheries worldwide at MEY or at maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) would require drastic reductions in existing fishing capacity
(Clark, 1990; Pauly et al., 2002; Willman et al., 2009; Sumaila et al.,
2012; Merino et al., 2014; Guillen et al., 2016). Indeed, Willman et al.
(2009) estimated that an extra $50 billion in rents could be generated
annually if global fishing capacity were cut by half. However, although
reductions in fishing capacity in terms of numbers of vessels have oc-
curred in many highly developed countries’ fisheries (Bell et al., 2017),
increased investment and development of improved fishing technolo-
gies have often resulted in increased catchability2 . Hence, reductions in
the numbers of vessels participating in a fishery may not lead to desired
reductions in exploitation rates (fishing mortality).
To understand the extent of the problems associated with
overcapacity and overcapitalisation in fisheries, requires an under-
standing of the relationship between capital, investment and realised
exploitation rates. According to Ackley (1978), it is important to dif-
ferentiate between the theory of capital and the theory of investment,
even though they are closely related. The theory of capital deals with
variation in capital levels and addresses the question of what is the
optimal amount of a particular type of capital. Conversely, the theory of
investment is about flows; i.e., what is the optimal rate at which capital
should vary when the amount of capital is not optimal. In this sense,
investment is defined as the change over time in the amount of capital.
Clark and Munro (1975) were the first to connect the theory of capital
and the theory of investment in fisheries. Subsequently the link be-
tween capital and investment theories in the fisheries sector has been
further reviewed, (see for instance, Greboval and Munro, 1999; Charles,
2007).
In fisheries, as for other renewable resources, four different types of
capital can be identified: natural, physical, human, and immaterial
capital. Natural capital refers to the fish stocks (the natural resources
under consideration), which are accessible to fishing firms (Scott,
1955). Physical capital relates to the fishing vessels (the production
factor where production capital is accumulated); but a more
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comprehensive definition would include all the equipment and infra-
structure associated with fishing activities. Human capital indicates the
labour inputs needed to catch fish. While, the immaterial capital relates
to the capital required for the intangible assets; for example, the re-
quirement to own fishing rights to operate in rights-regulated fisheries.
Most studies have focused on the relationship between natural and
physical capital; thereby addressing a dual investment problem, where
investment decisions can be taken with regards to the natural resource
and the physical capital required to harvest the resource (Clark et al.,
1979)3 . Investment in natural capital (i.e., fish stocks) usually implies
determining an exploitation rate (i.e., catches), which would be ex-
pected to result in a desired level of unexploited fish stock biomass.
Investment in the physical capital (e.g. number and size of vessels)
usually implies determining the fishing capacity needed to achieve a
certain exploitation rate. Early works by Smith (1968, 1969) re-
presented from a theoretical perspective, how decisions to invest (enter
or exit) in a fishery depend on anticipated profitability; the anticipated
levels of returns net of opportunity costs. Results from several empirical
studies on the factors that may influence investment in specific fisheries
indicate that participation in a fishery depends on expected future
revenues, stock status of main target species, first-sale fish prices, op-
erating costs (e.g. fuel), total fleet size (a proxy for congestion), the
opportunity cost of capital (i.e., profitability of alternative fisheries),
the impact of management measures (e.g. total allowable catches),
capital tax costs and depreciation policies, vessel age and vessel size
(Clark and Lamberson, 1982; Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Opaluch
and Bockstael, 1984; Ward and Sutinen, 1994; Jensen, 1998; Mardle
et al., 2005; Tidd et al., 2011).
Following Smith and Hanna (1990), fishing capacity can be dis-
aggregated into four components: (i) number of vessels; (ii) size of the
vessels; (iii) technical efficiency of vessel operation; and (iv) potential
fishing time of each vessel, per specified period of time, e.g. year or
season. Thus, physical capital investments in fishing capacity can be
accomplished by: (i) increasing the number of vessels; (ii) replacing
less-efficient vessels with vessels that are more-efficient; and (iii) im-
proving the technical efficiency of existing vessels (e.g. by in-
corporating improved fishing gear, more powerful engines or fish de-
tection equipment). Investments in physical capital typically result in
increases in catchability with the aim to increase catches, which often
leads to a decrease in the natural capital.
Research on capital dynamics has traditionally assumed physical
capital to be perfectly malleable, and consequently capital behaves si-
milar to variable costs (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1954; Smith, 1968,
1969; Burt and Cummings, 1970). This means that in fisheries, in-
vestments and disinvestments in physical capital can take place (e.g.
free entry and exit of vessels) to adjust the fishing capacity to the de-
sired exploitation rate of the natural capital.
However, often exists constraints on investments (and disinvest-
ments) in capital assets, which mean that to some extent, physical ca-
pital is non-malleable (Arrow, 1968; Arrow and Kurz, 1970). In fish-
eries, non-malleability or imperfect malleability of capital occurs
because capital cannot easily be shifted in or out of the fishery, thereby
entailing a certain cost (Clark et al., 1979; Clark, 1980; Ward and
Sutinen, 1994; Munro, 2010). For example, in many fisheries managed
using input controls, measures are often in place to prevent additional
investment, such as a closed list of licences (Pascoe et al., 2017).
However, to date, most of the literature has focused on the decisions to
enter or exit fisheries. In fact, vessels are more likely to enter a fishery
when profits increase than they are to leave the fishery when profits
decline. This is especially true if no profitable alternative fisheries are
available, because fishers have paid a high entry fixed (sunk) cost, equal
to the vessel value (Dixit, 1989; Ward and Sutinen, 1994; Ikiara and
Odink, 1999). In addition, high switching costs when changing fisheries
tend to limit capacity reallocation and fishers tend to stay within the
same fishery over time (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Opaluch and
Bockstael, 1984; Quillérou et al., 2013)4 . Nevertheless, the degree of
(non-)malleability of physical capital varies significantly from fishery to
fishery.
Therefore, imperfect malleability of physical capital may justify a
degree of overcapitalisation in a fishery (Clark et al., 1979). Thus, even
if the optimal long-run equilibrium is unaffected by the degree of
malleability of capital, the short-run optimal strategies can be sig-
nificantly affected. Consequently, the general theory of capital is often
not applicable in fisheries bio-economics.
Few empirical studies5 investigate investment in fisheries, its be-
haviour and drivers (Kirkley and Squires, 1988; Kirkley et al., 2002;
Nøstbakken et al., 2011). Possible explanations for the paucity of such
studies, are the limited data available on investment and capital in
marine fisheries (Kirkley and Squires, 1988) and the absence of a un-
ique and agreed measurement of capacity (Kirkley et al., 2002).
Economic and biological data for the EU fishing fleet, including
capital and investment, have been systematically collected under the
Data Collection Framework (DCF) since 2008 (European Union, 2008;
STECF, 2017). According to STECF (2017), the capacity of the EU fleet
decreased gradually between 2008 and 2016: the number of vessels
decreased 13%, horse power by 15% and gross tonnage by 19%.
We are interested to know how investments in the EU fleet fishing
fleet physical capital have been taking place. Investments and disin-
vestments (i.e., changes in the value of the fleet) can be accommodated
by changing the number of vessels or the value of the vessels in a fleet.
Hence, this study uses DCF data to investigate the investment decisions
of the EU fishing fleets during the period 2008–2016. This is done by
analysing whether the capital value in a fleet has increased or decreased
and if that has happened due to changes in the number of vessels or the
value of the vessels. More than that, it is analysed whether these in-
vestment decisions have delivered positive outcomes for society in
terms of added value increases, and so if these investment decisions
have been efficient and desirable.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Methodology
To determine whether changes in the value of a fleet are econom-
ically beneficial, information regarding the current performance of the
fleet is required. Such information can be obtained from observed
trends in profitability. We propose to use Net Value Added (NVA), the
sum of the returns to both capital (i.e., net profit) and labour (i.e.,
salaries), as a measure of profitability as it is generally regarded as a
better means of defining the returns to society than using profits alone
(Chen et al., 2005; Guillen et al., 2015).
Net value added is the value of output less the values of both in-
termediate consumption and consumption of fixed capital. Hence, we
estimate NVA as:
3 It should be noted that individual fishing firms can normally decide on the
physical, human, and immaterial capital levels, through investing and disin-
vesting; but rarely on the natural capital. This is because as individual firms,
they do not have a tangible means to invest in fish stocks. Decisions regarding
the natural capital level and consequently on iinvestment decisions, can only be
taken by managers or sole-owners of a fishery.
4 In many fisheries worldwide, physical capital investment decisions are also
driven by the non-malleability of human capital, which includes the relatively
low risk of losing the fishing job, low overhead costs, and the possibility of
massive losses (following exit) for those with large investments in the fishing
sector, due to low second-hand prices for fishing equipment (Oduor-Otieno
et al., 1978; Ikiara and Odink, 1999).
5 See for instance, Clark and Lamberson, 1982; Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983;
Opaluch and Bockstael, 1984; McKelvey, 1987; Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987;
Ward and Sutinen, 1994; Jensen, 1998; Mardle et al., 2005; Tidd et al., 2011.
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NVA=Total Revenues – Fuel costs – Other variable costs – Repair and
maintenance costs - Other non-variable costs – Depreciation costs (1)
The value of the fleet (i.e., capital) is estimated as the tangible assets
value, measured as the depreciated replacement value, as collected
under the EU data collection framework (DCF). The variation of capital
from year t-1 to year t can be considered as the real investment in ca-
pital (capital flow) taking place in a fleet.
Based on the above observations we can identify the basis for a
decision rule to determine whether investments are, or have been, ef-
fective from a society’s welfare point of view:
• When investments or disinvestments lead to increases in the NVA,
they can be regarded as effective, heralding improved and sustain-
able long-run profitability of the fishery;
• When investments or disinvestments lead to decreases in the NVA,
they can be regarded as detrimental to the long-run profitability of
the fishery.
The outcomes of investments can be determined for different stra-
tifications, e.g. fishing region, country, and fleet. We can identify at the
fleet level where over- or under-investment occurred.
We consider that investment and disinvestments can be considered
effective (i.e., desirable) if they deliver a benefit to society, expressed as
an increase in NVA. Using such an approach, we classify the outcome of
an investment as one of four types (see Table 1).
• Type 1: investment led to an increase in NVA: Investment was ef-
fective.
• Type 2: disinvestment led to an increasing NVA: Disinvestment was
effective.
• Type 3: investment led to decreases in NVA: Investment was in-
effective; an undesirable situation, urged to disinvest.
• Type 4: disinvestment led to a decrease in NVA: Disinvestment was
ineffective or not sufficiently effective. Further disinvestment may
have been needed. The resource may have been largely over-
exploited or economic conditions worsened. It is an undesirable si-
tuation.
2.2. Data
The data on the EU fishing fleet used in this study have been as-
sembled from the 2018 Annual Economic Report of the EU fishing fleet
(AER; STECF, 2017). The AER uses data collected under the DCF
(European Union, 2008) and reported by EU Member States in response
to the 2018 fleet economics data call. The data requested were for the
years 2008 to 2016.
The AER reported separately by fleet segment6 and at overall
Member State level the following variables: transversal variables (ca-
pacity, landings and effort); economic variables (income, costs, em-
ployment, enterprises, capital value and investment). Monetary vari-
ables reported as nominal values in the AER were converted to real
values, adjusting them by the real inflation rate, following the metho-
dology described in the AER (see for instance, STECF, 2017).
In this study, we analyse data at fleet segment level only for those
fleets that have reported all relevant variables for the period
2008–2016. This concerns data for 242 fleets which on average for the
period 2008–2016, represented a total of 34,039 vessels (52% of the
active EU fleet), €3.87 billion in physical capital (78% of the active
fleet), and generated €1.99 billion in NVA (72% of the total). No fleets
from France, Greece and Croatia were considered in the analysis be-
cause of missing data (for more details, see STECF, 2017). The 242 EU
fishing fleets analysed and their average number of vessels, capital
value, capital per vessel and net value added for the period 2008–2016
are presented in Supplementary materials 1.
3. Results
Information on investment decisions and their outcome by fleet
number and weighted by the number of vessels in each fleet are sum-
marised in Tables 2a,b. This analysis has been replicated by sea basin
(Northeast Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea) and fishing activity
(small-scale and large scale fleets) and reported in Supplementary
materials 2 due to space limitations in the main text.
During the analysed period, more fleets (of the selected fleets) dis-
invested than invested. Disinvestment are mostly due to decreases in
the number of vessels. When investing, most of the capital increases in
the fleet are due to increases in the average value per vessel. Investment
expressed as increases in the average value of the vessels (on average in
more than 50% of the cases for the period 2008-16) is more common
than investment expressed as an increase in the number of vessels (less
than 20%); while increases in both the average value of the vessels and
in the number of vessels took place in about 30% of the cases (Tables
2a,b). Over the entire period 2008–2016, the total capital investment
increased for about 40% of the fleets included in the analysis, and so
disinvestment occurred in about 60% of them (Fig. 1a).
The NVA had been positive for more than 85% of the fleets analysed
and overall this proportion has gradually increased to almost 95% in
2016. Initially, about 40% of the fleets showed an increase in NVA, and
so the NVA decreased for 60% of them. But the proportion of fleets with
an increasing NVA increased to about 60% in the last years (Fig. 1a).
When weighting this analysis by the number of vessels in each fleet,
NVA was positive for more than 90% of the vessels, the proportion of
vessels with an increasing NVA increased to more than 80%, while the
proportion of vessels investing decreased from almost 60% to slightly
more than 20% (Fig. 1b). These differences in the results between the
proportion of fleets and the proportion of vessels are because small-
scale fleets are on average compounded by a larger number of vessels
than large-scale fleets.
When this analysis is replicated by sea basin and fishing activity, it
can be seen that Northeast Atlantic fleets perform on average better and
more fleets are investing than Mediterranean fleets. Moreover, large-
scale fleets outperform the small-scale fleets, in particular in the
Mediterranean Sea (see Supplementary materials 2) (Fig. 2).
Next, it is investigated the desirability of investment decisions in the
EU fishing fleets, i.e., when these investment decisions led to increases
in the NVA.
Of the 242 fleets examined for 2016, 6 fleets (29%) showed Type 1
outcomes of investment (investment is efficient since increases in in-
vestment lead to increases in added value). While, 88 fleets (36%)
showed Type 2 investment outcomes (disinvestment is effective as it
leads to increases in NVA), 25 fleets (10%) showed Type 3 investment
outcomes (investment was ineffective; an undesirable situation that
stresses the need to disinvest as increases in investment lead to decrease
in added value) and 61fleets (25%) showed Type 4 investment out-
comes (disinvestment ineffective or insufficiently effective: further
disinvestment may be needed as value added is still decreasing).
When looking at the distribution of investment types considering
Table 1
Classification of the investments according to the investment effectiveness as a
function of changes in the NVA and capital invested.
NVA Increase Type 1 Type 2
Decrease Type 3 Type 4
Investment Disinvestment
Capital
6 A fleet segment is the combination of a particular fishing technique category
and a vessel length category (see STECF, 2017).
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the vessels in each fleet, resulted that 64% of the fleets showed Type 2
investment outcomes, 20% showed Type 1, 13% showed Type 4, and
3% showed Type 3 investment outcomes. This shows that a large
number of small-scale fleets reached increases in NVA by decreasing
capital, i.e., disinvesting (see also Supplementary material 2).
When an investment in a fleet occurred, it increasingly led to in-
creases in the NVA (Type 1/(Type 1+Type 3)), from less than 40% in
2009 to more than 70% of the cases in 2016. While, when a disin-
vestment in a fleet occurred, it led to increases in the NVA (Type 2/
(Type 2+Type 4)) from less than 50% in 2009 to about 60% of the
cases in 2016.
4. Discussion
Between 2008 and 2016, the EU fleet decreased similarly in number
of vessels and in capital value, the average value per vessel remaining
relatively similar between 2008 and 2016 (own calculations from
STECF, 2017 data). This would signal a reduction of the fishing capa-
city, expected as the value per vessel has been relatively constant, but
the number of vessels has decreased.
Of those fleets where investment took place, increases in the
average value of vessels occurred in most cases, while disinvestments
are mostly due to decreases in the number of vessels.
A major difficulty for fisheries managers, is to determine the op-
timal level of fleet capacity because the optimal level will change
overtime depending on the status of the resources the fleet exploits and
the available fishing opportunities. Consequently, if fleets are to take
advantage of varying fishing opportunities, the optimum fleet capacity
will at certain points in time, include spare or underutilised capacity.
Similarly, industry’s investment decisions are inextricably linked with
economic and biological uncertainty (e.g. Arrow and Fisher, 1974;
Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). In an attempt to provide an objective
means to assess the desirability of investment in fisheries we propose a
4-stage classification of investment outputs.
Based on our proposed classification of investment outcomes (Types
1–4) we observe that:
• During the period 2009–2016, Type 1 desirability of investment
peaked in recent years to almost 30%, while in initial periods it
oscillated between 15% and 25%. Type 2 peaked in 2011, falling to
almost 25% in 2012 and 2013, but increasing since then up to si-
milar values than those in 2011.
• In 2016, 28% of the fleets analysed showed Type 1, 36% showed
Type 2, 10% showed Type 3, and 25% showed Type 4.
We further propose that only Type 1 and Type 2 can be considered
satisfactory. Therefore, the right investment decision, from a social
point of view, took place in about 60% of the disinvestments case and
more than 70% of investment cases in recent years. While, NVA was
positive for more than 80% of the fleets analysed, increasing up to 90%
in recent years.
Thus, results show that despite the overall decrease in the number of
vessels, the EU fishing fleet has been able to invest and disinvest in the
right fleets, especially in recent years. However, results vary slightly by
sea basin and fishing activity, with the exception of small-scale
Mediterranean fleets, which perform worse than the rest. This can be
explained by fish stocks in the Mediterranean not being restored, which
lead to low economic performance, and therefore, fishers are less keen
Table 2
Evolution of annual between-year investment and their outputs (changes in NVA) for the EU fleet. Values represent the number of fleets (a) and the number of vessels
in each fleet (b) exhibiting the different types of investment behaviour between the year indicated and the preceding year.
a)
Capital Number of vessels Average value per vessel NVA 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Increase Increase Increase Increase 20 23 9 15 20 28 22 29
Increase Increase Increase Decrease 26 15 9 8 10 18 9 5
Increase Stable Increase Increase 5 5 8 9 7 9 13 8
Increase Stable Increase Decrease 7 4 8 7 9 7 9 4
Increase Increase Decrease Increase 12 13 12 15 2 10 13 11
Increase Increase Decrease Decrease 13 14 7 13 10 8 6 3
Increase Decrease Increase Increase 10 19 6 16 8 18 19 20
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 28 14 14 16 13 14 18 13
Decrease Decrease Increase Increase 10 20 13 10 12 11 15 14
Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease 12 14 14 16 17 9 12 11
Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 11 9 17 12 13 18 14 19
Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease 9 9 12 6 20 6 8 12
Decrease Stable Decrease Increase 9 11 12 12 13 16 14 9
Decrease Stable Decrease Decrease 14 10 7 15 18 12 10 10
Decrease Decrease Decrease Increase 27 27 48 35 26 30 40 46
Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease 29 35 46 37 44 28 20 28
b)
Capital Number of vessels Average value per vessel NVA 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Increase Increase Increase Increase 3,611 2,149 410 700 1,421 1,250 2,436 3,291
Increase Increase Increase Decrease 957 9,598 5,665 789 550 2,900 1,752 130
Increase Stable Increase Increase 72 131 745 154 177 94 308 186
Increase Stable Increase Decrease 159 749 191 115 336 93 856 114
Increase Increase Decrease Increase 1,223 1,465 2,357 1,393 56 395 928 633
Increase Increase Decrease Decrease 608 867 149 2,775 1,422 1,781 824 176
Increase Decrease Increase Increase 8,854 2,124 911 1,499 936 1,953 5,224 2,416
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 4,568 3,934 463 2,536 5,418 397 2,278 569
Decrease Decrease Increase Increase 373 2,113 541 524 422 4,544 6,248 9,284
Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease 1,631 740 1,138 2,280 2,712 927 2,201 380
Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 1,264 1,970 4,786 2,896 884 7,623 2,297 5,806
Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease 2,069 2,629 1,704 251 6,916 1,608 920 1,021
Decrease Stable Decrease Increase 192 292 193 359 304 222 523 137
Decrease Stable Decrease Decrease 677 433 183 252 359 712 263 194
Decrease Decrease Decrease Increase 4,094 1,719 6,548 3,741 6,115 4,961 4,094 5,322
Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease 5,463 4,572 8,170 13,571 5,228 3,620 1,430 2,477
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to invest (D-Rocha et al., 2019).
Hence, in the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that invest-
ment decisions are analysed for such a large number of vessels and
fleets; the few empirical studies that investigate investment in fisheries
are often at the fishery level (e.g. Clark and Lamberson, 1982; Bockstael
and Opaluch, 1983; Opaluch and Bockstael, 1984; McKelvey, 1987;
Bjørndal and Conrad, 1987; Ward and Sutinen, 1994; Jensen, 1998;
Mardle et al., 2005; Tidd et al., 2011).
Several limitations must be taken into account when interpreting
the decision rule set out above. Firstly, fisheries are dynamic: fish
stocks, labour, demand and costs are constantly subject to change.
Consequently, the optimal economic position in terms of NVAmax7 also
changes constantly. The net effect of such changes is that the fisheries
tend towards the equilibrium position (i.e., open access) while man-
agers often target MSY or MEY, rather than achieving an absolutely
stable position. Such apparent contradictions nevertheless do not de-
tract from the utility of our proposed investment classification because
the changes in investments and in NVA are captured in the classification
of investment types. However, classifying investments in this way does
not provide any reliable predictive power, because what could be op-
timal one year, may not be optimal in subsequent years. This also ex-
plains part of the inter-year oscillations.
The bio-economic model, and so the decision rule, relies on a de-
terministic model of the fish stocks which assumes that changes occur
only as a result of the physical ability of the fish to reproduce and grow,
a constant rate of natural mortality and as a result of fishing. Fish stocks
are, however, subject to additional natural variability that cannot be
modelled and therefore it adds variability and uncertainty to the
system. The analysis assumes a static long run equilibrium; however, in
the short run, the optimal reference points may imply a higher level of
exploitation because of the existence of a social time preference dis-
count rate (Pontecorvo and Schrank, 2009). In any case, similar con-
clusions may be drawn from both analyses.
There may be a time lag between the time that the decision to invest
takes place, the timing of the investment spend and the time that any
resulting costs and benefits originated from this investment occur. For
example, Bjørndal and Conrad (1987), analysing the North Sea herring
fishery, estimated that when profits are positive, new vessels would
take two years to join the fishery (the time required to build a new
purse seine vessel). For the fleets in our study, such a time lag effect
may be vague since vessels may be allocated to different fleets in dif-
ferent years depending on the main fishing activity (predominant
fishing technique), as well as the availability of inactive vessels. In this
sense, inactive vessels behave as latent capacity. In 2015, there were 20
444 inactive vessels, about 24% of the whole EU fleet. The existence of
a significant amount of inactive vessels adds some flexibility to the
system; i.e., re-activation of inactive vessels under more favourable
conditions (e.g. increased fishing opportunities) would represent in-
vestment. Conversely, under less favourable conditions, vessels can
become inactive and cease to operate, in which case, they are not
considered in our analysis, but they would have to bear capital costs.
However, the existence of inactive vessels implies the existence of ca-
pital costs for those vessels, in addition to other potential costs such as
mooring or maintenance. Expectations on capacity adjusting subsidies
(i.e., buy-back programs) could lead to the existence of a higher level of
inactive vessels.
The data in our analysis relate to vessels aggregated at the level of
the fleet and are assumed to show the evolution of investment decisions
of a group of vessels with similar fishing activity. In reality, however,
within a fleet, the performance by individual vessels can be quite dif-
ferent. Unfortunately, sufficient data at the vessel level are not available
Fig. 1. (a, b): Share of fleets (a) and share of vessels by fleet (b) with increasing
capital, with increasing NVA and showing positive NVA. Values represent the
change in the proportion of exhibiting the different types of investment beha-
viour between the year indicated and the preceding year, e.g. the value for 2009
represents the change compared to 2008.
Fig. 2. (a, b): Evolution of investment types (in %) for the EU fleets analysed
between 2008 and 2016. Values represent the change in the proportion of fleets
(a) and vessels by fleet (b) exhibiting the different types of investment beha-
viour between the year indicated and the preceding year.
7 Conversely, MSY is not dependent on economic factors, but on changes on
the stock dynamics, fishing patterns and environmental conditions.
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to examine inter-vessel investment decisions.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the
online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2019.105396.
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